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Abstract—with the growing of network technology along with 
the need of human for social interaction, using websites 
nowadays becomes critically important which leads in the 
increasing number of websites and servers. One popular 
solution for managing these large numbers of websites is using 
shared web hosting servers in order to decrease the overall cost 
of server maintenance. Despite affordability, this solution is 
insecure and risky according to high amount of reported 
defaces and attacks during recent years. In this paper, we 
introduce top ten most common attacks in shared web hosting 
servers which can occur because of the nature and bad 
configuration in these servers. Moreover, we present several 
simple scenarios that are capable of penetrating these kinds of 
servers even with the existence of several securing mechanisms. 
Finally, we provide a comprehensive secure configuration for 
confronting these attacks. 
Keywords—Shared Web Hosting; Data Confidentiality 
Violation; Data Integrity Violation; Session Poisoning; Session 
Snooping; Log Poisoning; Log Snooping; Intensive LFI; CSRF 
Token Poisoning; Fast Brute Force; Convenient Phishing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some companies and organizations use dedicated web 
servers while the progression of hardware enables 
multitudes of websites to reside on one server. This solution 
is commonly known as Shared Web Hosting which has 
several advantages including affordability and using 
maximum power of server hardware. Another advantage of 
this solution is that it is not required for the website owners 
to be experts of the domain and they can only handle their 
own website applications. 
The risks and vulnerabilities involved with using shared 
web hosting can prevent it from always being an excellent 
solution. As claimed by Zone-H, an unexpected number of 
successful attacks were fulfilled after accessing a vulnerable 
website on a shared web hosting server and even secure 
websites like static pages also being hacked due to residing 
on shared web hosting servers [1] [2]. Various security 
challenges in different levels of network come along with 
these kinds of servers because there is no proper isolation 
between resources used by websites [3]. Also, having one 
vulnerable website on the shared server allows the attacker 
to hack into other websites with no struggle due to improper 
configuration of shared web hosting servers. 
In this paper, we present top ten most common attacks in 
shared web hosting installations and then provide a 
comprehensive secure configuration for shared web hosting 
servers. A specific configuration is needed for the shared 
hosting servers to become vulnerable to these attacks [3]. In 
this way, an attacker who controls a website hosted on a 
shared web hosting server is able to attack all other websites 
hosted on the same server. 
In this paper, we focus on the Apache webserver to 
present the attacks. Apache webserver as mentioned in 
Netcraft [4], is the most common used webserver among 
other webservers such as Microsoft IIS. In addition, the 
focus of this paper is on Linux operating system due to the 
fact that most countermeasures are developed for the POSIX 
operating system. Also, we use PHP programming language 
because of higher popularity, usability and reliability. 
However, it has to be known that any webserver with certain 
configuration can be vulnerable to the aforementioned 
attacks and they are not only for the Linux/Apache/PHP 
installation. 
In summary, this paper provides the following 
contributions: 
• We demonstrate top ten attacks in shared web 
hosting servers where six of these attacks are novel. 
• We provide sample codes to clarify the concept of 
these attacks. 
• We provide a comprehensive configuration for 
shared web hosting servers to encounter these 
attacks. 
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In 
Section  II, the overall architecture of shared web hosting 
servers is portrayed. We describe top ten most common 
attacks against shared web hosting servers in Section  III. In 
Section  IV, we present a comprehensive secure 
configuration for shared web hosting servers to defeat these 
attacks and we conclude in Section  V. 
II. SHARED WEB HOSTING ARCHITECTURE 
In order to gain a more precise view for understanding 
the attacks mentioned in the next section, we describe the 
shared web hosting architecture in this section. In shared 
web hosting, a webserver hosts many websites 
simultaneously. There is a FTP account for every website 
owner for uploading new files which are owned by the user 
account of the website owner. Webserver runs as a specific 
user account (apache, daemon, www-data) and handles all 
HTTP requests for all websites. Thus, it is necessary for a 
webserver to have the ability to read the files of every 
website. Despite this, users in some Content Management 
Systems (CMS) must be capable of uploading files thus 
besides reading files, write access to files and directories of 
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websites is also needed for a webserver [5]. 
In Figure 1 where web1 and web2 are owners of two 
separate websites, necessary permissions are shown for the 
Apache webserver in Linux operating system. 
 
Figure 1. Essential Permissions for the Apache Webserver 
There are two universal forms of webserver 
configurations for executing scripts in shared web hosting, 
which are: 
• Configuring the webserver to load the script interpreter 
as a webserver module 
• Configuring the webserver for running the script 
interpreter as a CGI [6] binary 
The webserver process loads the webserver module or it 
is compiled into webserver binary, meaning that a binary 
image of the interpreter exists in the webserver process. In 
CGI mode, by arrival of each request, the webserver will 
create a new interpreter process to handle it. In comparison 
to the CGI mode, using script interpreter as webserver 
module has advantages like more stability under load and 
more efficiency in managing requests and resources. 
However due to the fact that malicious scripts do not affect 
webserver process, the CGI mode is more secure. 
III. SHARED WEB HOSTING ATTACKS 
In Section  II, we provided an overview of how shared 
web hosting servers work. The attacks which we are going 
to present are based on the fact that there is no proper 
isolation between different websites hosted on the shared 
web hosting server. 
This weakness gives the attacker a set of capabilities like 
accessing files of other websites and exploiting the 
disclosed information (Data Confidentiality Violation), 
modify important files (Data Integrity Violation), force 
arbitrary sessions to the vulnerable websites (Session 
Poisoning), inspect and modify their session values (Session 
Snooping), manipulate logs of other websites (Log 
Poisoning), inspect their logs (Log Snooping), execute 
malicious code by using LFI (Intensive LFI), inspect and 
modify CSRF Tokens (CSRF Token Poisoning), launch 
brute force attack faster (Fast Brute Force) and easily phish 
victims (Convenient Phishing).The details of these attacks 
are presented in following sections. 
A. Data Confidentiality Violation 
In shared web hosting servers, webserver is run by one 
individual user account in a default way and the scripts of 
all websites are executed under that user account. Thus, this 
user account can access all files and folders and as a result 
all scripts of a website can access the files and folders of 
other websites. One attacker can access the files and folders 
of a website belonging to the victim and exploit the resulted 
information [5]. 
For instance, an attacker can generate malicious script 
and read the database configuration file which includes 
username and password (which are usually in clear text) and 
connect to database and read private data. Using this 
method, an attacker can exploit the resulted information and 
change the behavior of the website in a desired way. 
B. Data Integrity Violation 
As mentioned before, in shared web hosting servers 
users have read access to all files of all websites. But there 
are some websites like CMS that give the user the ability of 
uploading files. In this case if database is not used for 
storing uploaded files, the webserver user account should 
have permission for creating new files in folders of one 
individual website. In other words, webserver user account 
has read/write access. Since in the default mode, scripts of 
all websites run under webserver user account, by using this 
method attacker can recognize victim websites and change it 
in a desired way [5]. 
As an illustration, an attacker can write a script to search 
files with the read permission and find the vulnerabilities of 
websites and finally attacker can use another script to 
modify important files or create some new files in victim 
websites. 
C. Session Poisoning 
In shared web hosting servers, websites store their 
session files in temp directory based on their needs and all 
users can read or modify the files in temp directory. Thus, 
there is a strong possibility for users to have access to 
session files of a website in the case we do not use secure 
mechanisms. 
In Session Poisoning [7] attack, attackers create a new 
session file and force the victim site to use it like other valid 
session files. As an illustration assume that the victim 
website has an administration panel with an authentication 
page. When administrator login the page successfully, 
victim website defines a new session variable named as 
level and send session ID to the admin client. Thus, in future 
it is enough for administrator to send just the session ID and 
not all the login information. On the other side, an attacker 
can create a session file using his own website which 
includes the admin level variable. Finally, the attacker will 
see the administration panel of the victim website which 
sends the newly created session ID to the victim website. 
Since both websites hold their session files in temp 
directory, the victim website loads the session file uploaded 
by the attacker and consequently gives the attacker 
administration permission. This can be also done by the 
attacker with inserting one fake session in the temp folder if 
it is possible for him to write directly on the files of temp 
folder. 
D. Session Snooping 
In shared web hosting servers with default configuration, 
all websites store their sessions in one directory (e.g. /tmp). 
In other words, all websites can read or modify session files.  
In Session Snooping [7] attack, attackers analyze and 
modify the content of the session files of other website in 
order to exploit the results. For example, assume one forum 
as a victim website in which users can login and access 
different pages based on their permissions. The victim 
website uses username variable in its session in order to 
prepare appropriate results for different users. On the other 
d rwx r-x ---     web1:www-data      /home/website1/public_html 
d rwx r-x ---     web2:www-data     /home/website2/public_html 
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side, an attacker registers itself in victim forum and login 
successfully afterwards which leads in sending session ID 
from victim website to attacker. Then the attacker changes 
the value of correspondent username variable in new 
created session file to the username of the victim. Finally, 
the attacker reviews the victim websites and sends his 
session ID to it. Consequently, victim website loads the 
session file related to the session ID and recognizes the 
attacker as another user. Thus, the attacker can visit private 
information of other users. 
E. Log Poisoning 
Webservers usually save the information of processed 
requests in a log file. A log file includes information such as 
Domain Name, Client IP, Request Time, Request Type 
(GET or POST), Requested Filename, Size of Transferred 
File and Return Status Code from webserver [8]. The two 
attacks presenting are based on the fact that Webserver uses 
a single file for storing logs of various websites and the log 
file is accessible by every script executed by the webserver 
[9]. In the following sections, the details of Log Poisoning 
and Log Snooping attacks will be presented. 
In default configuration of a shared web hosting server, 
modifying the log file is only allowed by the root user and 
other users can only read it. Also, permission is required for 
a webserver to write in the log file regardless of the user 
account running with it. Therefore, in most webservers like 
Apache, parent webserver is executed with root privilege 
and child webservers are run by parent webserver to handle 
the requests. In Linux and other Linux-like operating 
systems, child processes inherit file descriptors opened by 
their parent process. Now by opening a file by a parent 
process in write mode, child processes are able to write in 
the already opened file. In this way, although not having 
root privilege, child webservers inherit the log file 
descriptor and can alter the log file. Scripts of websites are 
able to modify the log file since they are executed by child 
webservers. 
In Log Poisoning [9], a script is created by the attacker 
in order to find log file descriptor and open the log file in 
write mode. In Linux operating system for example, 
information about opened files of each process exists in 
/proc/PID/fd, where PID is the process ID. A PHP script is 
then created by an attacker for finding opened files of child 
webserver processes and the script is executed and the log 
file is opened again but with write access. The sample PHP 
script for Log Poisoning attack is displayed in Figure 2. 
In order to be susceptible to this attack, PHP interpreter 
must be used as an Apache module in Apache webserver 
because log file descriptor is not inherited by the new CGI 
interpreter process and as a result the log file cannot be re-
opened in write mode by the malicious PHP script. Clearing 
other websites’ requests for covering track of penetration 
and adding fake requests to the log file are examples of 
malicious activities which an attacker can carry out in case 
of having write access to the log file. We must emphasize 
that from a general view having write access to log file in 
shared web hosting will lead to very dangerous situation 
which attackers can fulfill various attacks on the hosted 
websites. 
 
Figure 2. Log Poisoning Attack Script (PHP-Module Mode) 
F. Log Snooping 
In default configuration, all scripts run by the webserver 
can read the log file because webserver user account has 
read access to log file. Therefore, scripts of one website are 
capable of reading logs of other websites located on the 
same shared web hosting server. In Log Snooping [9] attack, 
the goal of an attacker is to retrieve critical information by 
searching the other website’ logs in order to launch other 
complex attacks. Unlike Log Poisoning, Log Snooping 
attack is feasible in two modes which webserver runs the 
script interpreter (Module or CGI). 
 
Figure 3. Log Snooping Attack Script (PHP-Module Mode) 
 
Figure 4. Log Snooping Attack Script (PHP-CGI Mode) 
Even when configuring the log file as unreadable for 
other users, Log Snooping attack can be done using the PHP 
script shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Structure of files and 
folders of victim websites is one of the most important 
information that attackers can acquire by Log Snooping 
attack. Attackers can re-generate the site tree using 
requested URLs and find out about names of website files 
and folders. 
In several hardening best practices, the name of 
administrator authentication page is changed to prevent 
attackers from penetrating in the administration panel. 
Attackers can bypass this technique and find the 
authentication page by using the site tree. So, the attacker 
<?php 
    if ($dh = opendir('/proc/self/fd/')) { 
        while (($fd = readdir($dh)) !== false) { 
            if (strpos(realpath($dir.$fd), "access_log") !== false) { 
                $log_fd = $fd; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
        closedir($dh); 
    } 
    $file = fopen("php://fd/$log_fd", "w"); 
    fwrite($file, "Some Junk Data\n"); 
    ... 
    fclose($file); 
?> 
<?php 
    if ($dh = opendir('/proc/self/fd/')) { 
        while (($fd = readdir($dh)) !== false) { 
            if (strpos(realpath($dir.$fd), "access_log") !== false) { 
                $log_fd = $fd; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
        closedir($dh); 
    } 
    $file = fopen("php://fd/$log_fd", "r"); 
    $data = fgets($file); 
    ... 
    fclose($file); 
?> 
<?php 
    $file = fopen("/var/log/apache/access_log", "r"); 
    $data = fgets($file); 
    ... 
    fclose($file); 
?> 
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can use methods like SQL Injection to extract hashed 
password of administrator and find clear password text by 
using brute force of encoded password or using brute force 
for both user and password to discover the admin login 
credentials. A significant fact here is that the attacker cannot 
easily find the authentication page in case of not having 
access to the shared web hosting server. 
G. Intensive Local File Inclusion (LFI) 
Some websites are vulnerable since they allow special 
code reuse by including files through supplying the values 
of some parameters in URL. In this case, attackers try to 
misuse and include some malicious files. One of the most 
common attacks in this area is known as Local File 
Inclusion (LFI) [10] which leads in including victim 
website’s local file. During recent years, several methods 
like LFI2RCE [11] have been proposed which are able to 
execute remote code using LFI vulnerability. One method is 
to inject malicious code into the log file of webserver and 
include the log file by LFI which leads to execution of 
malicious code by victim website. 
But in case of large log file, this method is not effective 
due to the fact that websites cannot include the whole file. 
Generally, we can say without having access to the local 
victim file system, it is a complicated task to execute 
malicious code by including common files such as log file. 
But in shared web hosting servers, it is easier since there is 
an access to local victim file system and an attacker can do 
the LFI2RCE attack easily. As an illustration, attackers can 
create a malicious file in a path like temp directory which 
can be accessed by all websites and use the LFI attack to 
include malicious code and consequently execute its 
malicious code. Thus, we can conclude that in shared web 
hosting servers, LFI2RCE attack is more common than its 
alternatives. 
H. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Token Poisoning 
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF/XSRF) [12] is a type 
of vulnerability in a website whereby unauthorized 
commands are transmitted from a user trusted by the 
website.  In other words, CSRF exploits the trust a website 
has in the browser of users [13]. An easy and effective 
solution is to use a secret, user-specific and server-side 
generated token [12]. In this way, websites generate a token 
and sends it to the browser of the user. After that, the 
browser should use the token in all form submissions. When 
the website receives a request from a user, it checks the 
received token with the original one and if two tokens 
match, it will process the request of the user. Whereas 
attackers are not able to put the right token in their 
submissions, they cannot launch CSRF attack. 
Websites usually generate tokens per-session and save 
the token values in the corresponding session files. 
Attackers create some scripts to inspect and modify content 
of session files belonging to other websites in shared web 
hosting servers. As a result, attackers are able to modify the 
value of CSRF tokens which are located in session files. In 
this way, attackers can bypass CSRF prevention technique 
and send unauthorized requests to the victim websites. 
I. Fast Brute Force 
Nowadays, Brute Force [14] attack is known as a 
common attack on web applications for detecting 
passwords, directories, files and session IDs. Bandwidth 
protection and request controller tools are the main 
constraints of this type of attacks. In dedicated servers, 
attackers must follow remote attack in order to detect the 
password and most of attempts fail because of the low 
bandwidth. 
But in shared web hosting servers, attackers can try 
brute force attack locally without any bandwidth limit. 
Moreover, since shared servers usually have high processing 
power, attackers can use the CPU along with their goals and 
create a script including brute force code and start the attack 
on the victim website. So in shared web hosting servers, 
brute force attacks tried locally are generally faster than 
remote ones on dedicated servers. Trying local attempts not 
only bypass the bandwidth bottleneck but also bypass the 
protection mechanisms. 
J. Convenient Phishing 
Phishing is a kind of online identity theft in which 
confidential information of users such as bank account 
password or credit card information is stolen by displaying 
fraudulent web pages. Nowadays Phishing is an important 
attack on the internet and is accepted as a global criminal 
activity. In simple words, phishers try to redirect the users to 
a website where they are asked to enter the personal 
information. E-mail and online banking websites are the 
main target of phishing. Fake websites are designed in a 
way to seem as a legitimate website and afterwards phishers 
use the private information for malicious tasks [15]. 
Currently there are some techniques for protecting users 
against phishing [16]. But in shared web hosting servers, 
phishers can bypass many phishing prevention mechanisms 
because they can access to webservers of victims. For 
instance, users may use address www.website.com/~attcker/ 
page.php for login instead of www.website.com/~victim/ 
page.php. Interestingly, the prevention mechanisms cannot 
detect the anomaly activity since the domain address is the 
main domain of website and homographic domains have not 
been used. In other words, with access to shared web 
hosting servers, attackers are able to easily bypass many 
phishing obstacles. 
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE SECURE CONFIGURATION 
In this section, we present a secure configuration for 
Linux/Apache/PHP installations and how it confronts the 
attacks described in Section  III. Precisely observing and 
studying these attacks leads us to the fact that the rise of 
such attacks is due to the lack of proper isolation between 
different websites hosted on one server [17]. Following 
sections provide details of proposed configuration for shared 
web hosting servers. 
A. Script Execution Restriction 
In default shared web hosting configuration, all scripts 
are executed under the user account of the webserver 
regardless of their owners. Thus, a website is able to access 
resources of other websites. Due to the popularity of shared 
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web hosting, several methods have been presented for 
providing a more secure shared web hosting installation. 
Following sections introduce the most well-known 
countermeasures developed for this purpose. 
1) PHP Methods 
Safe_Mode [18] and Open_Basedir [19] are two 
methods which PHP developers are studying in order to 
solve the security problem, although they both carry on 
some limitations. In other words, PHP is not the right 
platform for unraveling the security problem [5]. 
Safe_Mode. In Safe_Mode, PHP examines the access of 
running PHP scripts to files based on their owners. PHP 
checks the owner of those files and if the owner of the file is 
not the same as the owner of the running script, PHP will 
not allow that access. However, Safe_Mode has a few 
limitations. It has to be known that some applications that 
upload files to server, the owner of them will be Apache 
user, not the script owner’s user account and those files 
cannot be accessed by the PHP scripts anymore [5]. 
Open_Basedir. In Open_Basedir, PHP determines the 
directory which each user is allowed to access. PHP 
examines the file access of running PHP scripts and do not 
allow access to files outside that directory [5]. 
2) Apache Module Methods 
By precisely seeing the security problem, the cause of 
the problem will rise as how we run the Apache server. 
Apache is executed by a unique user who can have access to 
all files of all websites. 
A new idea is that Apache can serve each website by its 
owner’s user account. In other words, each script is run with 
its owner’s user account permissions. suEXEC [20] and 
suPHP [21] are two well-known methods which use this 
idea and have been developed as an Apache module. 
suEXEC. The suEXEC includes a wrapper binary file 
and an Apache module. By the arrival of a HTTP request, 
the wrapper is run by Apache and the script name and 
user/group ID under which the script has to be executed is 
given to the wrapper. The suEXEC can only be used with 
CGI or FastCGI programs. For using suEXEC, a unique 
CGI or FastCGI binary file for each website is needed. The 
user/group ID of the owner must be the website’s owner. By 
the release of a new PHP version, these binary files must be 
updated and in case of using PHP in CGI or FastCGI mode, 
HTTP authentication feature cannot be used. Using suEXEC 
with CGI has very low performance in a way that Corentin 
Chary has named suEXEC a performance killer due to tis 
low performance in use with CGI [5] [22]. 
suPHP. Same as suEXEC, suPHP runs PHP scripts with 
a specified user/group ID. The suPHP has an Apache 
module and a setuid-root binary file. Unlike suEXEC, using 
suPHP will not require a unique CGI or FastCGI [23] binary 
file for each website. The low performance issue still 
remains in suEXEC same as the suPHP [5] [24]. 
3) Apache MPM Methods 
After the release of Apache 2.0, various MPM [25] 
methods have been introduced in order to solve the shared 
hosting security problem [5]. These methods are tested with 
greater details in the following sections. 
Peruser MPM. Because Metux MPM [27] is not 
appropriate for PHP, Sean Gabriel Heacock introduced 
Peruser MPM [26]. Peruser MPM uses processes instead of 
threads to handle requests. Peruser MPM runs an Apache 
control process as root privilege. The control process creates 
several multiplexer processes with Apache user privilege. 
The multiplexer process listens to port 80 and accepts 
incoming connections and reads the request to check from 
which website it is and it passes the connection to related 
worker process to be handled. The worker processes run 
under the user/group ID of respective owners of websites. 
The control process always maintains a pool of idle worker 
processes to enhance the performance and forks off new 
worker processes if there are no idle processes to handle 
new requests. However, one important deficiency of Peruser 
MPM is too much use of server resources [5]. 
ITK MPM. Steinar Gunderson presented ITK MPM 
[28] to reduce the shortcomings of Peruser MPM. ITK 
MPM creates a managing Apache process with root 
privilege. The managing process creates several listener 
Apache processes with root privilege. The listener process 
listens to port 80 and reads new request to determine the 
requested website. In order to serve the request, the listener 
creates an Apache handler process with user/group ID of the 
owner of the website. But, the main difference between ITK 
MPM and Peruser MPM is that the handler Apache process 
is terminated after the request has been completed. In other 
words, in ITK MPM there is no pool of idle handler 
processes for serving the requests [5]. 
B. Log File Separation 
Based on the fact that a webserver with default 
configuration will use a single file for logging activities of 
all websites, not having a proper separation between log 
files of different websites is the cause of log attacks [9]. The 
best solution for preventing these attacks is creating separate 
log file for each website and putting them in separate 
directories. Certainly proper permissions must be set on the 
log files to prevent a malicious user from reading or writing 
on log files of other websites [9]. A sample configuration in 
Apache webserver for creating separate log file for each 
virtual host or website is displayed in Figure 5. Also, the 
necessary permissions on log file directories in Linux are 
shown in Figure 6 where web1 and web2 are user accounts 
of owners of the corresponding websites. 
C. Session Storage Separation 
As same as log attacks, the main cause of session attacks 
is the lack of separation between session storage of different 
websites [7]. In case of Session Poisoning and Session 
Snooping attacks, a webserver with default configuration 
will use a temp directory for storing session files of all 
websites. Therefore, separating session storage for each 
website and providing separate directories for each one is 
necessary for stopping these attacks. In addition, proper 
permissions must be set on the session directories. Figure 5 
shows sample of configuring an Apache webserver for 
creating separate session directories for each virtual host or 
website and in Figure 6 the required permissions are 
depicted. 
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Figure 5. Log and Session Separation in Apache for Each Website 
 
Figure 6. Necessary Permissions for Log and Session Directories in Linux 
D. Local Access Limitation 
In shared web hosting servers, the local host is usually 
trusted and consequently an attacker, who has a website on 
the shared server, is able to launch attacks such as Fast 
Brute Force. In order to prevent such attacks it is a good 
idea to control local traffic. In other words, the local traffic 
must be gone through security devices like WAFs and 
NIDPSes before reaching target website. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today, shared web hosting is recognized as a popular 
approach to host thousands of websites but it has multiple 
serious vulnerabilities which are primarily due to the fact 
that different resources such as memory, CPU, network and 
file system are shared between different websites. 
In this paper we addressed common attacks in shared 
web hosting servers which exploit the lack of proper 
isolation between different websites resided on a shared 
server. Then, we presented a comprehensive secure 
configuration to prevent the risks of these attacks. As a 
conclusion we can say that although the mentioned 
mechanisms prevent the attacks directed towards the shared 
web hosting servers, but generally this architecture is not 
advised since it is potentially insecure and new solutions 
like virtualization are more secure and reliable. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Zone-H. Defacements Statistics 2010: Almost 1,5 million websites 
defaced, what's happening? http://zone-h.com/news/id/4737. 
[2] Zone-H: Defacements Statistics 2008 - 2009 - 2010*. http://zone-
h.com/news/id/4735. 
[3] S. Herber. The Challenge with Securing Shared Hosting. http://
blog.stuartherbert.com/php/2007/11/21/the-challenge-with-securing-
shared-hosting/. 
[4] Netcraft: October 2012 Web Server Survey. http://news.netcraft.com/
archives/2012/10/02/october-2012-web-server-survey.html. 
[5] S. A. Mirheidari, S. Arshad, and S. Khoshkdahan, "Performance 
Evaluation of Shared Hosting Security Methods," in the 11th IEEE 
International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in 
Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2012. 
[6] Apache: CGI. http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/howto/cgi.html. 
[7] N. Nikiforakis, W. Joosen, and M. Johns, "Abusing Locality in Shared 
Web Hosting," in European Workshop on System Security, Salzburg, 
Austria, 2011. 
[8] Apache Log Files. http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/logs.html. 
[9] S. A. Mirheidari, S. Arshad, S. Khoshkdahan, and R. Jalili, "Two 
Novel Server-Side Attacks against Log File in Shared Web Hosting 
Servers," in IEEE 7th International Conference for Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST), 2012. 
[10] G. Johnson, Remote and Local File Inclusion Explained.: Hacking9, 
2008. 
[11] T. Be'ery, "FYI: You got LFI," in Black Hat Europe, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, March 14-16 2012. 
[12] A. Barth, C. Jackson, and J. C. Mitchell, "Robust Defenses for Cross-
Site Request Forgery," in 15th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (CCS), 2008. 
[13] N. Jovanovic, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel, "Preventing Cross Site 
Request Forgery Attacks," in IEEE International Conference on 
Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks 
(Securecomm), 2006. 
[14] D. Endler. Brute Force Exploitation of Web Application Session ID. 
http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/SessionIDs.pdf. 
[15] Markus Jakobsson and Steven Myers, Phishing and Countermeasures: 
Understanding the Increasing Problem of Electronic Identity Theft.: 
Wiley, 2007. 
[16] Kirda E. and Kruegel C., "Protecting Users Against Phishing Attacks 
with AntiPhish," in Proceedings of the 29th Annual International 
Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'05), 
2005, pp. 517 - 524. 
[17] S. Herbert. PHP’s Built-In Solutions For Shared Hosting. http://
blog.stuartherbert.com/php/2007/11/27/phps-built-in-solutions-for-
shared-hosting/. 
[18] PHP: Safe_Mode. http://php.net/manual/en/features.safe-mode.php. 
[19] PHP: Open_basedir. http://www.php.net/manual/en/
ini.core.php#ini.open-basedir. 
[20] Apache: suEXEC. http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.0/suexec.html. 
[21] suPHP. http://www.suphp.org/Home.html. 
[22] C. Chary and C. Khamly. Securing A Shared Web Server. http://
xf.iksaif.net/papers/securing-a-shared-web-server.pdf. 
[23] Apache: FastCGI. http://httpd.apache.org/mod_fcgid/. 
[24] S. Herbert. Using suPHP to Secure a Shared Server. http://
blog.stuartherbert.com/php/2008/01/18/using-suphp-to-secure-a-
shared-server/. 
[25] Apache: Multi-Processing Module (MPM). http://httpd.apache.org/
docs/2.0/mpm.html. 
[26] Peruser MPM. http://www.peruser.org. 
[27] Metux MPM. http://www.sannes.org/metuxmpm/. 
[28] ITK MPM. http://mpm-itk.sesse.net/. 
 
<VirtualHost *:80> 
    DocumentRoot   /home/website1/public_html 
    ServerName         website1 
    ErrorLog               /home/website1/log/error_log 
    CustomLog           /home/website1/log/access_log common 
    php_value             session.save_path /home/website1/session 
    ... 
</VirtualHost> 
 
<VirtualHost *:80> 
    DocumentRoot   /home/website2/public_html 
    ServerName         website2 
    ErrorLog               /home/website2/log/error_log 
    CustomLog           /home/website2/log/access_log common 
    php_value             session.save_path /home/website2/session 
    ... 
</VirtualHost> 
d rwx r-x ---    web1:web1   /home/website1 
d rwx r-x ---    web1:web1   /home/website1/public_html 
d rwx r-x ---    web1:web1   /home/website1/log 
d rwx r-x ---   web1:web1   /home/website1/session 
 
d rwx r-x ---   web2:web2   /home/website2 
d rwx r-x ---   web2:web2   /home/website2/public_html 
d rwx r-x ---   web2:web2   /home/website2/log 
d rwx r-x ---   web2:web2   /home/website2/session 
